

44 *Florida Reports* 833 (1902); *Johnson and Johnson v. Wilson*, 48 *Florida Reports*, 76 (1904); Clark, "John Wallace," 419; *Jacksonville Evening Metropolis*, November 30, 1908.

⁴³Klingman, *Neither Dies Nor Surrenders*, 109; *Jacksonville Advocate*, May 30, 1896; Clark, "John Wallace," 426.

⁴⁴*Jacksonville Evening Metropolis*, April 10, June 3, August 27, October 28, November 21, 1901.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, February 17, 1902; July 21, 1904.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, November 24, 1903, March 11, 1905, February 1, 1906.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, April 8, November 2, 26, 30, 1908.

⁴⁸Fitzhugh Lee Styles, *Negroes and the Law in the Race's Battle for Liberty, Equality and Justice under the Constitution of the United States* (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1937), 61; *Jacksonville Evening Metropolis*, November 26, 1908.

The Legislative Response to the Glue Sniffing Epidemic in the Deep South, 1966-1969

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On June 12, 1966, *Atlanta Journal* columnist Robert Coram wrote an exposé on the glue sniffing phenomenon in the city. "What else is there for a 10 or 11-year-old boy to do? Here it is summer time and school is out. They can't drive a car the way big guys do. Going with girls is out. And who wants to hang around the back yard or even a big playground. There's really nothing left to do but take 15 cents, hop on down to the corner store, buy a tube of glue and a paper bag and have a real whinging of a glue sniffing party."¹

He explained for those uninitiated with the practice how glue sniffing worked, then removed his tongue from his cheek and launched into a blistering assault. There was the twelve-year-old

boy who quixotically attacked four Marines. Another who jumped from a building window after convincing himself he could fly. Another who lay on active train tracks to prove he was the strongest man in the world.

Fulton County Juvenile Court Judge Elmo Holt saw hundreds of such cases parading through his chambers. One sweep of a local elementary school, in fact, found thirty glue sniffers. Holt's concern about the problem led him to study the behavior of juvenile delinquents in Atlanta. Of the ninety-six boys serving in the juvenile detention center, thirty-six admitted to being glue sniffers, and thirty of those were deemed by staff officials to be "chronic users." It was reasonable to assume, argued Holt, that at least ten more were either afraid or unwilling to admit use. If such numbers held outside of the detention center, "then we're in trouble—real trouble."²

On top of its immediate dangers, he argued, glue sniffing surely had more lasting effects: it could cause sterility; it could cause brain damage; it unquestionably did cause skin inflammation. "They come in here with their eyes bugged out, their faces flushed and they don't know what's going on," Holt said. "We've had them in here accused of robbery, burglary, rape and murder. We ask them about the charge and they say, 'I don't know...I've been sniffing glue.'"³ Such psychological effects were even more dangerous. Coram cited a direct link

between early onset glue sniffing and later destructive drug and alcohol behaviors, as children—usually between 12 and 14—"graduated" to other substances when they became older. Girls were not immune to such behavior, but it was largely a male phenomenon, and the boys who did sniff glue were generally those with low self esteem, followers "whose inner nature predisposes them to a less-than-normal interest in the opposite sex."⁴

In place of petitioning for legislation against the practice, Holt sent circulars to stores who sold model glue warning them not to supply the substance to children without parental consent. The "voluntary support by the merchants" was a key component in controlling the problem, but it was also impossible to regulate such behavior through circulars. Reports surfaced that at some Atlanta stores, children would buy several tubes of glue, and clerks would offer them paper bags to use for huffing it.

And so, decided Holt, the real onus fell to parents. "The underlying problem," he argued, "is lack of supervision at home." Parental neglect or lack of concern only abetted a would-be glue sniffer. Clinton Chafin, Atlanta's superintendent of detectives, agreed. "The problem is getting more serious by the day," he said. "Consequently, this imposes a great responsibility on parents to inform and educate their children on the real dangers

involved in glue sniffing." There was, after all, only so much Chafin could do. Glue sniffing was not illegal. Since Georgia's juvenile court had jurisdiction over the "health and welfare of juveniles," judges like Holt could intervene in glue sniffing cases, but until the practice led adolescents to some other form of juvenile delinquency, the court's hands were tied. And that was the largest problem because, said Holt, in Atlanta, "glue sniffing has reached epidemic proportions."⁵

Still, Atlanta's response to the "epidemic" was largely to encourage merchant and parental responsibility. Holt acknowledged that if he had known what kind of problem glue sniffing would become in 1966, he would have pushed for legislation in January, but even with the problem metastasizing in front of him, he was not pushing for legislation in June.⁶ Less than a month later, in response to a Houston ordinance that prohibited the distribution of model glue to anyone under twenty-one, editors of the *Journal* questioned its readers in an editorial. "What kind of a society is it that has to pass laws to prevent misuse of such a mundane item as glue? And we will leave it for everyone present to answer. After all we are that society, aren't we?"⁷

That society had built itself over the last three centuries on personal responsibility and individual rights over and against a legislative program that further impinged on what Southerners deemed to be personal liberty. The year prior,

southern legislators had made much the same case against the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, vocally decrying federal intervention into a closed system. Glue sniffing and its discontents would provide a trial of the veracity of such claims. Most of the Deep South states would decide to solve the problem with legislation—Louisiana and Florida were finalizing legislation even as the *Journal* editorial appeared—but the machinations that provided that legislation, as well as the legislation itself, would draw clear distinctions between the states in their thinking about such conundrums and the imperatives that created such thought.

Still, despite the variances in interpretation among Deep South legislatures, all of the states in the region debated such a law, and all but Alabama passed one. The process belied the myth of the solid South, but the imperatives that drove legislatures to support such a measure did bridge the significant chasms of race, urban-rural divide, and even party loyalty, and they did so despite the fact that months prior, before the racial defeats of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, such legislation would have been interpreted as the epitome of frivolous government intervention and an assault on the personal liberty and business independence that drove white southern arguments against such civil rights mandates. The Deep South was slow to respond to the glue sniffing epidemic of the 1960s, but when it did, its state-initiated

legislative agenda was far more comprehensive than any other region in the country.

The general human obsession with inhalation for intoxication had deep roots, from the oracle at Delphi to Judaic biblical ritual. Nitrous oxide was discovered in 1776 by Joseph Priestly, and ether followed soon on its heels. Chloroform was discovered in 1831. As the nineteenth century became the twentieth, the development of paint thinners, varnishes, lighter fluid, polishes, and dry-cleaning supplies provided a variety of publicly-available products with organic solvents that could be inhaled for some range of hallucinogenic or intoxicating effect. Model airplane glue was always one of those products, but it never appeared in any of the myriad declamations produced by those warning of the deleterious effects of such activities through the 1950s.⁸

Then, as if from nowhere, the first reports of problematic behavior with model glue appeared in 1959, when a series of children in western cities such as Tucson, Arizona, and Pueblo, Colorado, were arrested for delinquency after it was discovered they had been huffing glue. The *Denver Post* picked up on the story and did its own exposé, leading other papers to crusade in much the same way. That story, in August 1959, either provided the initial shot across the bow for research into the subject or convinced children in the area to give it a try, because over the succeeding years, Colorado's

youth experienced a legitimate "epidemic." Police raids in Denver turned up glue sniffers in many areas. Soon youth arrested for more serious crimes like robbery were blaming their behavior on glue.⁹

The rapid development of the "epidemic" quickly spread throughout the country. Or, perhaps, the Colorado investigations led other states to start emphasizing analysis of such behavior, which virtually every investigation found. Salt Lake City's problem became national news in short order. New York's epidemic began in 1961, with health officials and law enforcement officers publicly wringing their hands about instances of glue sniffing and the overwhelming availability of a product that was, essentially, designed to be in the hands of children. In 1963, the *New York Times* recorded the city's first death: a fourteen-year-old boy walked off his Brooklyn roof after inhaling model glue. The city's Board of Health responded by banning the sale of model glue to anyone under eighteen.¹⁰

But it did not help. In 1964 and 1965, there were stabbings, more falls from buildings, and drownings. Despite the ordinances, laws, and hand-wringing nothing could quarantine the epidemic. It spread throughout the country and even appeared overseas. In 1967, five deaths in Japan were blamed on lacquer sniffing. Stories in papers like the *Times* told of rooftop sex orgies fueled by glue sniffing intoxication. "You take a tube of plastic glue," one

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user told *Time* magazine in 1962, "the kind squares use to make model airplanes, and you squeeze it all out in a handkerchief, see. Then you roll up the handkerchief into a sort of tube, put the end in your mouth and breathe through it. It's simple and it's cheap. It's quick, too. Man!"¹¹

Of course, the 1960s were the age of the countercultural revolution and the backlash to Vietnam. Glue sniffing, however, was fundamentally different. Though the growing use of psychotropic drugs became a dominant story throughout the decade, it was a distraction to those worried about sniffing model airplane glue, not an aid. Whereas the expansion of drug use was problematic, it was largely a teenage issue. Model airplane glue was affecting children as young as eight. While countercultural activists and users like the *Time* interviewee did sometimes use glue, they were not the focus of the problem. The hysteria over glue sniffing focused on adolescent abuse of a substance that parents were actually giving their children—a substance that children were encouraged to use in most circumstances.

There is no reason to believe that such behavior somehow avoided the American South prior to the second half of the decade. New York had far less in common with conservative, Mormon Salt Lake City, for example, than it did with Atlanta. But the "closed society" of the protectionist South still in the throes of the Civil Rights

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Movement and its attendant political upheavals kept such concerns from the front pages of southern newspapers. There was no new social menace more threatening to the area's traditional mores than integration. But as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 came and went, proving to the white South that civil rights was an epidemic they would never be able to quarantine, the congressional losses freed southern legislators to focus on the subtler illnesses that plagued the youth of the region. Certainly there was a different southern mindset concerning federal intervention in racial matters and a state's right to regulate something like a controlled substance, but the Deep South emphasis on individual liberty, combined with growing Sunbelt business imperatives, made government intervention to control model airplane glue inconsistent at best with dominant political custom. By the time that Deep South legislatures began seriously emphasizing glue sniffing as a legitimate epidemic, myriad municipalities, ten other states, and Puerto Rico had already passed laws regulating the use and purchase of model glue. Interestingly, however, conservative western states like Colorado, Arizona, and Utah had not passed laws, preferring instead to let city ordinances in large metroplexes handle the problem.¹² Conservative law makers of the South—after the failures of Massive Resistance to the Civil Rights Movement—would be far more proactive at the

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state level, making a late but concerted effort throughout the second half of the 1960s to stop the trend in its tracks.

Lake Ponchartrain is a massive brackish estuary lying along the northern outskirts of greater New Orleans. Second in size only to Utah's Great Salt Lake, it was not exactly secluded, but it was far enough away from New Orleans to provide protective cover from the watchful eye of the police, if the group of teenagers needed protective cover at all. They had come out to the lake to get high, but in the warm spring of 1966, they were not technically doing anything illegal. It was not heroin. It was not pot. It was not even LSD (which would be outlawed by the federal government later that year). The kids had come to Lake Ponchartrain to sniff glue.¹³

Sniffing glue was not technically illegal in Louisiana, but police raided the party anyway. They saw a problem, if not a crime. In April, the state's Social Welfare Planning Council (SWPC) held a seminar in New Orleans on the developing drug epidemic in the state. Glue sniffing, said the American Social Health Association's Charles Winick, was ominous. "We not only have the immediate problem of the youngster dosing himself, but this may be a prelude to a graver social pathology in addition to the widely reported instances of death and bizarre behavior, such as walking off roofs and in front of cars."¹⁴ If that were

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not enough, Winick told his New Orleans audience, glue could ultimately be a gateway to marijuana, LSD, or heroin.¹⁵ Louisiana's lawmakers were listening.

On May 25, 1966, a contingent of forty-five Louisiana state representatives brought a new bill to the House floor. It was designed to amend the criminal code to regulate the sale and use of the glue used to make model cars and airplanes. The next day, the proposed legislation went to the Judiciary Committee, and by early June the bill had received a favorable report. It was given a third reading on June 6, then passed (with four votes against) and ordered to the Senate on June 13.¹⁶

The bill was spearheaded by New Orleans congressman Eddie Sapir (from the city's Thirteenth Ward), who assured families that children with legitimate interests in models would not be punished. Their parents could buy them the necessary glue. Besides, he argued, both the FBI and juvenile court judges all supported such measures by state governments. Others had already passed such laws. Sniffing glue led to "cruel or violent behavior" and needed to be stopped. "Police records are full of violence and crime because of glue sniffing," Sapir told reporters, "and it only costs fifteen cents a tube. There are no controls now whatsoever."¹⁷

Controls were precisely what were needed. Three days prior to House passage of the glue

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sniffing bill, thirteen-year-old Henry Borsch lay dead beside a half empty can of gasoline in a vacant Monroe parking lot. It was not Borsch's first time sniffing glue, but his worried parents had always managed to find him and stop the behavior before the damage was irreparable.¹⁸

While the bill moved through the House, a study sponsored by the city of New Orleans found evidence of increased narcotic use of model glue and other inhaled solvents by children eleven to thirteen years old, leading councilman Clarence O. Dupuy to sponsor a citywide anti-glue sniffing ordinance, which passed unanimously. The measure made sniffing glue illegal in New Orleans and placed restrictions on its purchase. Selling model glue to anyone under eighteen also became a crime. It was, said Dupuy, "the most comprehensive legislation prepared to date in the United States to combat the ever-increasing menace of glue sniffing to children." The SWPC endorsed the ordinance, as did the Metropolitan Crime Commission and the New Orleans Health Department.¹⁹

Although the ordinance was passed unanimously, there was debate. Councilman Walter F. Marcus, Jr. wondered about the House bill moving through the legislature and wondered whether or not the state law would override the city ordinance. After all, the city's plan ensured that glue would be sold with model kits. All sales to minors outside of those bounds would require

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written consent from a parent or legal guardian. Dupuy reassured Marcus. He would ask the Senate to amend the bill to fall in line with Orleans Parish. "This glue-sniffing has become such a menace, that the city just can't stand by and wait to see what the legislature will do."²⁰

Sapir, Dupuy, and Marcus all were from New Orleans. Of the forty-five representatives sponsoring the bill, twenty-two were from Orleans and Jefferson parishes. Four more were from East Baton Rouge Parish, two more from Caddo, home to Shreveport. One was from Lafayette. Eight more were from parishes surrounding those urban areas. Only seven, in fact, were from rural outlying parishes.²¹ The movement, then, was fundamentally urban. Rural areas were neither immune from drug abuse, nor were they lacking kids who spent their free time constructing models. But urban drug abuse was far more prominent, and the pitfalls that accompanied crowded city life made such drug abuse more dangerous, whether that danger came from drug-related violence or from accidents created by intoxication. "Walking off roofs and in front of cars," after all, becomes proportionally more dangerous as the buildings get taller and the traffic becomes more congested.

It would be tempting to argue that rural areas were less likely to support such legislation because of an antipathy to excessive legislation, or because of an antipathy to urban problems in

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general, but that element of the urban-rural paradigm does not seem to be in evidence in Louisiana's glue sniffing debate. Two of the four house votes against the initial glue-sniffing bill came from rural parishes, but the other two came from Rapides and Calcasieu parishes, home to moderate-sized cities Alexandria and Lake Charles, respectively.²² Furthermore, when the machinations of law-making ran their course and a final vote was taken, the verdict was unanimous. So the glue-sniffing measure was fundamentally urban because Louisiana legislators saw glue sniffing as an urban problem, but state consent was broad in its application, easily bridging the urban-rural divide.

The principals had something else in common, as well. They were all white. Still, though this was a South in the throes of civil rights, the glue sniffing measure was supported across racial lines. The United Voters League (UVL), founded in 1955 by Ellis F. Hull, was one of a number of voting rights organizations in the state, including Alexander Tureaud's Orleans Parish Progressive Voters League, the Crescent City Independent Voters League, the New Orleans Voters League, and the New Orleans Voters Association. The UVL's base of support was in the Second Ward, but its influence gave Hull a loud voice. And Hull wanted the glue sniffing legislation passed. "We the United Voters League, Inc. wholeheartedly support House Bill #752," stated a letter from the UVL to

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every Louisiana legislator. "Because of a definite increase in the sale of large quantities of glue to minors by community stores and its improper use by buyers, this could lead to the child or children becoming a dope addict; for it is a fact that unrestricted sales of this glue have contributed to juvenile delinquency in the New Orleans area."²³

Such was the power of the issue. Glue was an intoxicant, and therefore influential with children and teenagers of any race or color. It was cheaper than Schedule One narcotics, so it was available largely to the poor. It was used for model airplanes and cars, which came in simple, cheaper as well as elaborate, more expensive versions, so it was also in the hands of the more affluent who favored such diversions. Glue sniffing, however, did not have the broader power to unite the races in a time and place of racial conflict. A united white and black front against juvenile delinquency did not develop. But the epidemic was able to link the interests of white and black New Orleans parents in a way that was far more visible than it had been previously.

When the Louisiana Senate took the bill from the House, its own Judiciary Committee found it satisfactory in early July, but floor debate led to a series of amendments proposed by group of senators led by George D. Tessier, who was, unsurprisingly, from New Orleans also.²⁴

Councilman Dupuy had instigated much of the amendment talk, but his desire had been to find a

"happy medium" between his city ordinance and the House bill. But there was nothing medium about the proposed amendments. The House bill defined "model glue" as any substance containing one of twelve different solvents, along with "any other solvent, material, substance, chemical or combination thereof having the property of releasing toxic vapors."²⁵ It made sniffing or inhaling any such substances a misdemeanor, as it did selling or transferring them to minors unless the donor was a parent or guardian. Fines ranged between twenty-five and one hundred dollars and up to ninety days in jail.²⁶

Senate revisions, however, listed twenty banned solvents.²⁷ Along with citing the illegality of inhaling those solvents, it also made "induc[ing] any other person to do so" a misdemeanor offense. It prohibited possession with intent to use and possession with intent to distribute. Sale to minors had to come with written authorization from parents or guardians, and files had to be kept on all such sales for police inspection for at least one year. Wholesalers could only sell model glue to retailers "customarily handling such product in the ordinary course of his or its business at a fixed location." And retailers could only sell it if they were recognized as "bona fide" in that custom. Even if retailers did receive their product through reputable wholesalers, and even if they had established credentials as the sort of place that found it

necessary to sell model glue, they were still barred from selling more than one tube to any customer, regardless of age, for any twenty-four hour period. Finally, retailers could not keep model glue on public display, giving easy access to shoplifters.²⁸

The Senate rejected every substantive amendment twenty-four to fourteen (with one absentee). The new version of the bill made model glue seem like a class one narcotic and put a broad range of strictures on small businesses. While paranoia about the destructive narcotic use of chemical solvents was certainly real, the imposition on sellers pressed what the body of small government conservative Democrats could take. Still, when the original version of the bill was called to a vote, it passed unanimously.²⁹ The amendments that did make it through were brief cosmetic and grammatical additions, and the House quickly and unanimously approved them and passed the revised bill on July 7. It was signed later that day.³⁰

The new law took its place in Part V of the Criminal Code, those "Offenses Affecting the Public Morals." Part V had been modified extensively since the end of World War II. The revised statutes of 1950 included amongst its crimes against public morality statutory rape, prostitution, abortion, homosexuality and bestiality (lumped together as "crimes against nature"), and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Also

included was a provision against "cruelty to juveniles," broadly construed.³¹ By 1968, prostitution and crimes against adult morality had been excised from Part V, replaced by a new litany of "offenses affecting the health and morals of minors." Selling alcohol, poisonous reptiles, and pornography to minors was off limits. It was also illegal to give minors tattoos. The model glue statute resided in the set of offenses particularly targeted at juveniles.³²

This was understandable. Childhood and its pitfalls seemed far more dangerous for baby boomers, who grew up in a crucible of student protest, Black Power, and the counterculture that moved around all of it. Still, the placement of the legislation is telling. The glue sniffing ban was not housed with other criminal drug offenses. Heroin, it seemed, could be dangerous to anyone, but sniffing household solvents was something clearly within the purview of adolescents. Here again is the discrepancy between the Senate's amended bill and the House's original and final product. The Senate amendments made the glue sniffing legislation into a drug bill. But in the minds of the bulk of state legislators, it was not a drug bill. It was a bill promoting "the health and morals of minors." Not all states would view such legislation in the same light.

In practice, however, the law gave authorities guidance as to the arrest and punishment

of offenders. The law could work as a drug bill if it had to. Still, the most significant case stemming from the legislation fell wholly in line with the state's thinking. In *Louisiana v. Dimopoullas* (1972), a defendant charged with indecent behavior with juveniles was simultaneously charged with using glue as an accessory to the crime. An adult woman brought model glue to the home of a minor for the express purpose of getting him high, thereby enhancing his willingness "for commission of lewd and lascivious acts." This was transfer without parental consent. It was transfer for the purpose of unlawful inhalation. It was a version of what would later be termed statutory rape. And, ultimately, it was blatant disregard for "the health and morals of minors."³³ Such was the core of Louisiana's thinking about model glue. Had the two conspired with cocaine, for example, the drug charge would have superseded the couple's "lewd and lascivious acts," and, more than likely, the teenager would have been seen as a co-conspirator. Because the glue sniffing law aided protective childcare over and against the toxin's narcotic classification, however, the teenager became a victim. *Louisiana v. Dimopoullas* was not a drug case. It was a case involving the corruption of a minor. Such subtle differences gave model glue a unique standing in Louisiana law. It was a drug, but it was also a tool to corrupt the morality of minors. Although illegal narcotics certainly have the power to corrupt the

morality of minors, they need not do so. Moreover, plenty of things other than drugs—poisonous reptiles, for example—can also corrupt their morals. The definition of the law and its placement within the criminal code ultimately changed the criminal meaning of one specific form of narcotic intoxication, making that form of intoxication a fundamentally different crime than all the others.

The placement of the Louisiana law also made it fundamentally different than those of other southern states that passed similar statutes. The following summer, for example, on May 9, 1967, Elizabeth J. Johnson, a Republican state senator from Cocoa Beach, Florida, joined across party lines with twenty-one of her colleagues to introduce the state's first glue sniffing measure. Meanwhile, across the hall in the House of Representatives, George Firestone, a Democrat from Miami working in tandem with Johnson, introduced the same measure. HB 1378 and SB 893 differed in name only, a plan by Johnson and Firestone intended to ensure swift passage of what was seen in a state with a legitimate handful of urban areas as a necessary solution to a growing problem.³⁴

Again the movement was far more than urban. Johnson recruited almost half of the state senate as cosponsors of the bill, legislators representing Miami, Jacksonville, and Tampa, but also Windermere and Altamonte Springs, DeLand and Pinellas Park. There were eleven Democrats

and eleven Republicans in the only Deep South state with a significant Republican population.³⁵ Furthermore, throughout the process of adoption, Firestone would be joined in the House by four fellow representatives, all of whom requested to be recorded as co-introducers of the bill.³⁶ The result was once again a bipartisan group, again a genuine blend of urban and rural representatives.

Still, the legislature was far from unanimous on how such a law should be framed and administered. When the Senate bill emerged from the Judiciary Committee in early June, it included recommended amendments limiting the ability of retailers to sell more than one tube of model glue to any customer within any designated twenty-four hour period and barring them from publicly displaying the product on their shelves. Model glue would have to stay behind the counter. The merits of such clauses as preventative measures against possible abuse were obvious, but the budding Sunbelt was less than anxious to place restrictions on businesses simply because it was possible that potential customers might use their products in ways other than those recommended by the manufacturer. Though cosmetic amendments to the original legislation were made and passed later that month with relative ease, the Judiciary amendments went down to defeat. Lakeland's Lawton Chiles proposed striking the suggested additions. The Democrat was not one of the bill's many

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cosponsors, but he was sympathetic to the cause. Portraying business owners as aiding and abetting, however, would not benefit the growth and development of Lakeland.³⁷

The vote was close, twenty-one to seventeen, but the additions were eliminated. Again, the votes did not fall along party lines, or along urban-rural divides. There was no unanimity among the bill's sponsors, as they too split on whether or not to legislate the responsibility of sellers. After the contention had run its course, the bill in its final form was read a third time and passed unanimously, forty to zero, with eight members absent from the chamber. Though the role of sellers remained a point of debate, everyone, it seemed, wanted to regulate the users.³⁸

Meanwhile, the House Judiciary Committee recommended its version of the glue sniffing bill a week prior and without any substantive changes. Still, later in June, Firestone offered to amend his own bill to match what the Senate Judiciary Committee was seeking in its own legislation. His proposed amendments, along with similar cosmetic changes, included the provisions against same-day sale and public display, and those amendments in the House passed without contest.³⁹

But this was ultimately a Senate project, and Firestone, working in tandem with Johnson, was clearly providing the best backup plan possible pending any setbacks in the other chamber. On July

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1, 1967, the adopted Senate version made its way to the House. Though Firestone led the adoption of some further changes to the bill, most notably a standardized definition of what the legislature meant by the term "model glue," he bypassed the seller provisions, willingly substituted the Senate version for his own, and submitted the now-amended Senate bill for a floor vote in the House. It passed ninety-three to one. The Senate approved the changes, and on July 14 the bill was sent to the governor.⁴⁰

The final form of Florida's law listed twenty substances "commonly used in the building of model airplanes, boats and automobiles." It made intentional use of model glue for various forms of intoxication and possession or transfer for such purposes illegal. The maximum penalty was set at \$500 or six months in prison.⁴¹

Florida's legislature placed the law in Chapter 877 in the Miscellaneous Crimes section of the Criminal Code. Unlike Louisiana's law, and those of its fellow Deep South states that would follow, Florida's statute took its place among provisions against tampering with sewer systems, tattooing minors, killing young veal for profit, and mislabeling illegally slaughtered beef.⁴² Florida, in other words, was clear that this was criminal activity, that sniffing glue was both drug use and a phenomenon that was detrimental to the health and morals of minors, but the overwhelming impetus to

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pass such legislation never translated to a broader discussion about exactly what kind of law it was creating.

Florida's juvenile courts did not keep records specifically for glue sniffing offenses, but they did catalog offenses related to "use or possession of narcotics." In 1965, no such cases existed. That number rose steadily to nine in 1966 and forty-three in 1967, the year the glue sniffing measure took effect. The problem, however, is that without any quantifiable measure of which narcotics were being confiscated, the numbers provide little help in demonstrating either a root cause or a justification for the placement of the law. Still, it is significant that "use or possession of narcotics" was in each of those years at the bottom of the juvenile court statistics lists, paling in comparison even to the far more serious crimes of grand larceny and robbery.⁴³

Still, the reality of the glue sniffing menace, as demonstrated in *Louisiana v. Dimopoulos*, was that it could act as an agent for many of those other, more serious crimes. A 1969 edition of *Florida Health Notes* reminded readers that "a teenage boy who had sniffed three tubes of glue, bashed in the heads of his younger brother, mother and father while they slept." The article posited that the boy was the victim of an unhappy home. Sniffing glue became a method of escape, until it ultimately circled back to create a new, more monstrous set of

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problems. Fittingly, the legislature responded the following year, 1970, with the Drug Abuse Education Act, creating a comprehensive narcotics education program in Florida public schools.⁴⁴

That placement would also have standing in law. In 1973, a juvenile defendant appealed a delinquency conviction on charges of inhalation of harmful chemical substances on grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the chemicals had produced intoxication, but the court ruled that "a chemical analysis was not essential to proof of the charge." In a similar appeal the following year, the court sided with the convicting Dade County Circuit Court, holding that intoxication was sufficiently proven and that "constructive possession" was enough to validate the charge anyway.⁴⁵

With the glue-sniffing "epidemic" clearly declining over the 1970s, the court was not so willing to acquiesce. A similar appellant in 1978 argued that his conviction was invalid because the glue sniffing measure did not include definitive "warnings of proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." The vagueness of the law (always a potential problem in Louisiana's legislative debates, as well) made it unconstitutional. It was not the first time such a question arose. In 1968, Attorney General Earl Faircloth gave an opinion in response to what exactly the law covered. He argued that model glue "must be a type of glue or cement commonly used

in the building of model airplanes, boats and automobiles which contains one or more volatile solvents." The state's worry stemmed from the law's clause adding "any other solvent, material, substance, chemical or combination thereof, having the property of releasing toxic vapors," but the attorney general argued that the addition did not create any new category of toxic substance. It was a catch-all, and catch-alls never came with the requisite specificity to back formal charges against a defendant. Ten years later, during the 1978 vagueness appeal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the appellant. It acknowledged that Florida's law looked similar to other state statutes regulating glue-sniffing, but that such similarity did not warrant sustaining a law that did not provide specific warnings against improper use.⁴⁶ With that, Florida's regulation of glue sniffing came to an end.

Glue sniffing as a state phenomenon occurred later in Mississippi than it did in Louisiana and Florida. Without the urban hubs of those states, rural Mississippi teenagers were possibly immune from the harsher consequences of the glue-sniffing phenomenon. But more than likely, without the urban dangers that brought such problems to public light, it simply took the Mississippi powers a little longer to catch on. The State Department of Public Welfare's youth court statistics did not acknowledge a glue sniffing case throughout the early 1960s. Glue sniffing finally emerged as a

category in 1967, but it was still far down the list of delinquent acts, well behind theft, disturbing the peace, assault, runaway, sex offense, and others. Still, that did not make the twenty-three cases that came before Mississippi youth courts that year any less important.⁴⁷

Two of those cases were referred to the court as cases of parental neglect, both by black parents. Of the twenty-one additional cases, thirteen of the juvenile offenders were black, seven white, with one unspecified case. All of them were male. Race, however, cannot be seen as a significant factor in glue sniffing arrests. In 1968, for example, seventeen of the twenty-two cases were against white juvenile offenders. Only five were black. 1968 did witness the prosecution of two females, but the vast majority of cases were still male.⁴⁸

Regardless of gender and race, the problem had clearly grown enough to draw the attention of the Mississippi legislature. On Tuesday, February 13, 1968, both the House and Senate introduced glue sniffing bills and referred them to their respective judiciary committees. The Senate committee was the first to report back and adopted the bill with one revision. The original legislation included a minimum fine of one hundred dollars and a maximum of five hundred to accompany a maximum prison term of ninety days. The Judiciary Committee dropped the minimum fine, but otherwise kept the legislation in its original form.⁴⁹

When the bill passed the Senate, it moved to the House, whose Judiciary Committee was still considering its version. The House crafted a compromise measure that kept the elimination of the minimum fine but adopted the measure as House Bill No. 281. Then it was back to the Senate, who pushed the new House bill through Judiciary and passed the measure on July 9. The governor approved the new law on July 12, 1968.⁵⁰

A number of factors stand out about the Mississippi legislation. First, there were far more votes against the measure than in Louisiana and Florida. The Senate bill was introduced by Bill McKinley and Jean Muirhead, both from metropolitan Jackson. They were attorneys and members of various civic organizations.⁵¹ They had perhaps the best vantage point from which to view the problems glue sniffing could cause. In contradistinction to such advocacy, five senators voted against the Senate bill that moved back to the House before the compromise. Four of the five were from traditionally rural areas. Four were farmers. The fifth, Tommy Munroe, was an oil worker from the coastal military town of Biloxi.⁵² These statistics might seem to argue for another clear urban/rural distinction in shaping such policy, but the simultaneous introduction of the House version of Mississippi's glue sniffing bill makes such conclusions far more complicated.

Of the fifteen representatives who sponsored the legislation, ten of them were from Hinds and Harrison counties, the state's two most populous. The other four legislators hailed from decidedly smaller towns in rural counties.⁵³ When the bill passed its first time in the House, there were three representatives who voted against it. David Halbrook was from tiny Belzoni and Tommy Campbell was from Yazoo City. But Robert L. Lennon was from the relatively urban college town of Hattiesburg. In addition to such disparities, the core fact remains that the vast majority of both urban and rural representatives, whether lawyers, farmers, or anything else, all voted for the measure in its final form.⁵⁴ As in Louisiana and Florida, the impetus for such legislation clearly stemmed from urban areas where the bulk of such problems occurred, but, for the most part, outlying areas agreed that the phenomenon required legislation. There are a number of possible reasons for this acquiescence. First, glue sniffing was not solely an urban phenomenon. Second, the bulk of national publicity that the glue sniffing epidemic received provided an overarching sense that more was to come. Mississippi was late to such legislative imperatives and had been privy to a decade's worth of exposés on the inherent subversiveness of model glue. Third, the youth courts had already been convicting teenage offenders since 1967, so the legislation could easily be interpreted as a

validation of current practice or as a deterrent to future abusers. Finally, and corollary to youth court conviction statistics, sniffing glue was an instigating agent in myriad other juvenile offenses. Its use made adolescents more likely to disturb the peace, to steal, to fight, to commit various sex offenses. By legislating away one of the causes of such behavior, legislators from all parts of Mississippi hoped to curb the dominant forms of juvenile crime.

With such entrenched imperatives governing the process, votes against the Mississippi glue sniffing bill seem far more the result of political posturing rather than any philosophical problem with the bill itself. When the approved House measure returned to the Senate and the vote was taken on the final compromise measure, votes in the negative increased to nine. But only Tommy Munroe, the least likely of the original Senate detractors, remained in the core group of opponents. The other four, all rural farmers, approved the final draft of the bill. The eight who replaced them among the negatives all originally voted for the bill, and all came from decidedly different backgrounds. Lawyers and farmers from both rural and relatively urban districts opposed the measure. One, H.C. Strider of Charleston, was the former sheriff of Tallahatchie County.⁵⁵ All eight voted for the original bill, and the new version incorporated the one change the Senate judiciary committee made,

excising the minimum fine from the legislation. The only difference between the original bills was the designation. The Senate was now voting on House Bill 281, not Senate Bill 1072. While the possibility exists that eight senators from eight different districts each had a significant change of mind about the nature of the glue sniffing bill, the votes (in what appeared to be a foregone approval) were most likely the result of legislative rivalry.

The bill that rivalry created was remarkably similar to the one created by Louisiana. Mississippi had learned from its neighbor. Not only was there no substantive debate about the possibility of creating a drug bill along the lines of Louisiana's rejected proposal, but also there was no substantive debate about the wording of the law at all, with the exception of the penalty clause. In fact, Mississippi's law listed the exact same solvents as did Louisiana's final draft—in the exact same order. Its description of the unlawful act of sniffing glue was the same. Its description of unlawful transfer was the same. With the exception of an omission of Louisiana's caveat that the glue sniffing statute "shall not apply to the inhalation of any anesthesia for medical or dental purposes" and a slight rewording of the definition of custodial vendors, the Mississippi law was a direct crib of its counterpart two years prior.⁵⁶

The one substantive difference between the two bills was the value of fines associated with the

offense. The Mississippi Senate rid itself of the one hundred dollar minimum fine, but Louisiana's maximum fine was only one hundred dollars. Of course, the other principal difference between the two pieces of legislation had nothing to do with the wording of the bills themselves. Louisiana clearly saw its law as an element of child protection, placing it under the auspices of the broader heading, "The Health and Morals of Minors." Mississippi saw its law differently. House Bill No. 281 was not a drug bill but not necessarily a morality bill, either. Instead, legislators placed the bill amongst "Crimes Affecting Public Health," grouping it with a series of other legislative strictures on poisons—buying or using arsenic illegally, selling poisons to minors, poisoning fish or other animals, poisoning food, drinks, medicines, or poisoning with intent to kill.⁵⁷ Glue, in the mind of Mississippi, was a poison, cordoned off through that definition from both juvenile delinquency and drug offenses.

Still, there are no points in lawmaking for originality, and the law's placement in the criminal code still made it valid and (hopefully, thought Mississippi) preventative. Prevention is hard to gauge for a crime that yielded twenty-two convictions in the year of its passage and twenty-three the year prior. The small statistical sample makes any real conclusions about prevention impossible to draw, but in 1969, the total number of convictions did drop to fifteen, a statistically

significant reduction. In addition, cases of juvenile theft dropped from 2,255 in 1968 to 2,021 in 1969. Sex crimes dropped from 159 to 122. Such reductions cannot be placed solely at the feet of the glue sniffing bill, but glue's consistently cited role in the commission of such offenses prior to the legislation indicates it was effective.⁵⁸

Mississippi, however, was not the only Southern state debating the merits of glue sniffing legislation in 1968. Elmo Holt had done his best in 1966 to instigate a renaissance of merchant and parental responsibility in dealing with the glue sniffing epidemic plaguing Atlanta, but fellow juvenile court judge Curtis Tillman was not satisfied. At his request, DeKalb County passed an ordinance in August 1966 to deal with the "growing menace," allowing for prosecution of persons under the influence of model glue and limiting individual purchases of the substance to one tube per visit.⁵⁹ It was not a particularly stringent ordinance, but it was a start. However, DeKalb County, while part of the metroplex, did not cover much of Atlanta proper. Any kind of systemic change would need to come either from Fulton County or from Atlanta city officials.

Early the following year, Atlanta's Board of Aldermen passed such a preventative ordinance. It banned the sale of model glue to anyone under eighteen and limited the purchase by anyone else to one tube in any twenty-four hour period. Sniffing

was illegal, but possession was not. "This keeps children who make model airplanes from buying it, but it doesn't preclude possession of glue," explained Alderman Richard Freeman. "The child's parents could get it for him."⁶⁰ Atlanta's version was an important effort and similar to DeKalb County's, but it seemed to fly in the face of Holt's original assessment of the problem. In June 1966, Holt argued that a lack of parental concern was at the heart of the epidemic, but Atlanta's ordinance seemed to place the responsibility for glue use directly in the hands of parents. Such discrepancies made the bill seem like a temporary fix rather than a final solution.

The same month Atlanta's new ordinance appeared, the Georgia Department of Public Health featured a cover story in its newsletter on the glue sniffer's "quest for ecstasy [*sic*]." The intoxicant could cause brain damage or death, but even in cases less severe, glue sniffing created its own form of imprisonment. "With only a brown paper bag and a 10¢ tube of glue a teenager is quickly caught-up in a fantastic world of vivid dreams and hallucinations. Entering this world, like entering Dante's immortal hell, can be a step 'into the eternal darkness, into fire and ice.' It is a world from which some never completely return." But when the metaphors were removed, the medical risks were harder to assess. The concentration of various solvents in the glue, the frequency of use,

and the physiological differences among users all played roles. Along with brain damage, argued H.K. Sessions, a medical doctor with Georgia's Occupational Health Service, kidney trauma appeared to be the most common medical problem associated with sniffing glue, followed by blood dyscrasias, particularly evinced by bleeding in the lungs. When sniffing glue was combined with other stimulants, the danger increased, and it was, like so many other stimulants, addictive. Police Superintendent Chafin noted that from January 1966 to January 1967, police arrested 176 glue sniffers.⁶¹

The Georgia Department of Public Health article closed by describing Atlanta's new ordinance. "Is this the answer? Can legislation prevent teenagers from trying this tempting bout with danger? Will educating teenagers to the permanent damages of glue-sniffing discourage them from trying a fad? The answers are unknown."⁶² That they were. But it seemed from available data that the best chance at controlling the fad was a combination of legislation and education. To that end, the *Journal* published an in-depth interview with a Vietnam veteran from Atlanta, a twenty-two year old who had been a glue addict for the past three years. "Steve," as the article called him, was largely unrepentant about his behavior, though he had been hospitalized and jailed several times. He was temporarily committed to the state

mental hospital at Milledgeville. "It's a safer release than a lot of possible releases that society does accept," he argued. The interview used Steve's story as a cautionary tale. He was denied promotion in the military and lost several jobs. His wife disapproved, and now she was pregnant.⁶³ The message was clear: sniffing glue could take over your life and destroy it bit by bit.

The unstated lesson from the article was that glue sniffing was not solely an adolescent and teenage phenomenon. Steve was an adult, a veteran. Both DeKalb and Atlanta's ordinances did include a prohibition on purchasing more than one tube of glue at a time, but other than that, both were directed primarily at children. The laws in Louisiana, Florida, and Mississippi had the same focus. Steve represented a far different demographic, one that largely had been ignored by southern legislators.

Still, the vast majority of abusers over the preceding two years had been juveniles. So, on January 9, 1968, Savannah's Jay Gardner introduced a bill into the Georgia Senate to prohibit distribution and use of model glue for intoxication. As in the cases of other states, the bill after a second reading moved quickly to Judiciary Committee.⁶⁴ But in the intervening time between its introduction and emergence from committee, glue sniffing again entered the news. On Monday, January 15, a sixteen-year-old boy engaged in a firefight with

Atlanta police, at one point moaning to draw officers into his home on the suspicion that he had been wounded. They were there to act on a burglary warrant, but when they finally subdued the boy, he excused the gunfire stating, "I didn't know what I was doing. [The glue] made me go crazy. I saw visions." Officers did find over two dozen tubes of model glue in the boy's apartment.⁶⁵ The stakes had risen. Glue sniffing had become more than a truancy instigator, a gateway drug, or a health issue for troubled kids. Now it was putting the lives of police officers in danger.

At the end of that week, as the sixteen-year-old boy waited in lockup, the Senate glue sniffing bill emerged from committee for a floor vote. In its original form, Gardner's bill prohibited sniffing glue, prohibited its sale for illegal purposes, prohibited transfer and sale for those under twenty-one without written consent, and required merchant record-keeping of minor sales. The Judiciary Committee added one substantive amendment to the bill, indemnifying minors who transferred glue to friends for completing models or for other lawful purposes. There would be, in that situation, no need for the minor to keep a record of the transfer or to show written consent before the transfer, as merchants were required to do. In addition, the bill's definition of model glue included far more chemical solvents than any of its predecessor bills.⁶⁶ The Senate bill was aggressive, emphasized the role

of adults, and sought to be comprehensive in its scope. It appeared to be, more than any other bill from any of its neighbor states, a drug bill.

The comprehensive nature of the bill seemed to fit the overwhelming problem stemming at the very least from Georgia's metropolitan areas. When speaking about the bill to reporters, Gardner specifically mentioned adult admissions to the state mental hospital resulting from addiction to solvents found in model glue. The Senate passed the bill on January 19 and transferred it to the House ten days later.⁶⁷

But the House would seek to rein in the overarching scope of the Senate version. Significantly, however, the body would not remove its fundamental nature as a drug bill. Its Committee on Special Judiciary adopted amendments to the Senate bill that reduced the age of minors from those under twenty-one to those under eighteen. It added a separate provision that assured municipalities and counties that any existing or future ordinances they passed related to glue sniffing would not be repealed by the state bill, providing that any future local ordinances remained consistent with the legislation. The committee also included a new section stating that in the event that some part of the glue sniffing bill would be declared unconstitutional, that the remainder of the bill would remain valid, as "the General Assembly hereby declares that it would have passed the

remaining parts of this Act if it had known that such part or parts hereof would be declared or adjudged invalid or unconstitutional."⁶⁸ Protecting local government against larger, superseding laws had always been a hallmark of southern legislative thinking, and salvaging parts of legislation against the supposed tyranny of appellate courts had been a lesson hard-learned by southern lawmakers in the preceding civil rights decades. But unlike its Louisiana counterpart, the Georgia legislature did not take the opportunity to negate the broader scope and thrust of the bill, modifying it into a law to govern juvenile delinquency.

This version passed overwhelmingly. The House approved the measure 180 to 2, but there really is no way to draw any substantive conclusions about the two. Richard L. Starnes from Rome, for example, was the author of Georgia's 1967 abortion statute, which was designed to protect women at risk of death and those who had been victims of rape, along with protecting doctors against prosecution for the service. Did his relative liberalism lead him to see this as an unnecessary crackdown on liberty? Did his distance from Atlanta blind him to the urban epidemic? These are questions that cannot be answered. Luckily, they do not need to be answered. The massive, overwhelming vote in favor of the measure speaks to the virtual unanimity of Georgia's legislators on the need for the legislation. As in Louisiana, it

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crossed both gender and racial lines, for the Georgia House had been forced to seat eight black legislators following a 1966 Supreme Court ruling. The black congressmen voted for the bill, and all but two men agreed that the legislation was necessary. When the amended version moved back to the Senate, for example, it received another unanimous vote. The governor signed the bill on April 9, 1968.⁶⁹

Regardless of the nearly universal support for anti-glue sniffing legislation, the situation on the ground—in Georgia and across the Deep South—demonstrated that all glue problems were not made equal. Atlanta witnessed a far more dramatic glue sniffing problem than did rural outlying areas, and so the chain of legislative action begun at the local level advanced to state legislation, with the provision, added by the Georgia House, to respect existing local ordinances and to allow new ones that did not directly contradict the state law. The concession disappeared when in April 1970, state Attorney General Arthur K. Bolton issued an unofficial opinion declaring that “a city may not adopt an ordinance prohibiting glue sniffing, already denounced by a statute.” According to Georgia’s constitution, special laws concerning issues already covered by general laws were expressly prohibited. Bolton cited two drunk driving cases from the early 1950s in which the state Supreme Court overturned

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convictions under municipal ordinances because the action was already prohibited by the criminal code.⁷⁰ Intentions be damned (to say nothing of protections against the encroachment of larger governments against local versions or an inherent fear of the power of appellate courts), that portion of the glue sniffing legislation would be excised in the early 1970s.

The excision removed one of the principal differences between Georgia’s law and those of its neighbors, but the remaining differences were still significant. The Georgia statute, in fact, appeared far more similar to the Louisiana Senate’s amended bill than to anything that had passed through a southern legislature. It required written records of sales to everyone under eighteen, it required written consent of parents before minors could purchase glue, and it prohibited both possession with intent to use for intoxication and possession with intent to distribute. Like its counterpart laws, the Georgia measure set such offenses as misdemeanors, but imposed no minimum or maximum penalties. Finally, the bill did not limit its list of banned solvents at twelve or to twenty. The Georgia law listed thirty-four chemicals as ingredients that would make “any glue, cement, solvent or chemical substitute” functionally illegal.⁷¹ Unlike Louisiana, Florida, and Mississippi, Georgia had created a drug law.

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Consequently, it took residence in the "Controlled Substances" section of the Georgia Criminal Code with other drugs and intoxicants.⁷² With the kinds of stipulations enforced in the legislation, and with the kinds of publicized offenses leading to its passage, it was simply impossible to construe the law as one preventing juvenile delinquency. The "health and morals of minors" were important, but Georgia's law was describing something fundamentally broader than that. Poisons, too, required state regulation. But Georgia's law was far more severe than that of Mississippi. When it was being used as an intoxicant, sending users into "Dante's immortal hell," model glue was nothing more than a narcotic that required regulation, punishment, and prevention.

No matter how the House tried to respect local municipalities, this was still a heavy-handed assault on the new drug "epidemic" sweeping the South, and other states in similar positions would cringe at its passage—not because they were not suffering a similar epidemic, but because of the heavy hands trying to cure it.

On May 6, 1969, well after its fellow Deep South states had passed legislation regulating the sale and use of model glue, Alabama's *Birmingham News* ran an Associated Press story recounting the retirement of Los Angeles police chief Thomas Reddin. "I've about reached the point in my

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thinking," said Reddin, "where I'm almost willing to write off a generation of young Americans." Reddin stressed communication between police and youth, perhaps a series of programs designed to bridge the chasm of mistrust that had steadily grown between them.⁷³ Later that morning, Alabama, the most reluctant of the Deep South states to discuss the possibility of regulating inhalation acts, witnessed its first glue sniffing bill hit the House floor before moving to the body's Health Committee.⁷⁴

It was clear, however, that glue was not a priority. The bill did not receive a second reading for more than a month. Though the Health Committee approved the measure on June 10 and the Rules Committee included it on the docket's priority list the following week, it was allowed to die on the floor without a vote.⁷⁵ Such was the fate of many such Alabama bills, and the late consideration and lack of serious debate might lead one to conclude, particularly in light of the measures in neighboring states that came before it, that Alabama's paranoia about bureaucracy and its devotion to the primacy of local government ultimately won the day. Again, however, such assumptions about a unified South shunning only the bare necessities of legislative need do not hold.

In clear contradistinction to each of its predecessor laws, all of which were sponsored primarily by urban congressmen, the Alabama bill

was sponsored by six representatives, none of whom were from the Birmingham metroplex. John William Grayson was from relatively large Mobile, and John Culver and Bert Bank were from the college town of Tuscaloosa. Representatives from Anniston, Gadsden, and Jackson rounded out the group.⁷⁶ Alabama's effort was decidedly bereft of such urban imperatives that drove the initiation of similar legislation in similarly-minded states. This seeming anomaly, however, does not muddy the established paradigm. The precursor Deep South states all came to an urban-rural consensus before passing legislation, and with such a consensus firmly in place, authorship of the Alabama law seems almost a *fait accompli*.

Still, this is not to say that urban-rural distinctions did not play a role in Deep South governance. The same day the Alabama glue sniffing bill came out of committee, a new *ad valorem* tax bill designed to redefine intangible taxable personal property to include mortgages, domestic stock holdings, and insurance bonds appeared on the floor of the Senate. Introduced by Alton Turner of rural Crenshaw County, it was clearly designed to profit from such urban "property" holdings and thereby equalize the urban-rural share of state property taxes. "If the urban boys can expect us to equalize taxes by assessing a \$1,000 piece of land in Crenshaw County at 30 per cent of its fair market value," argued Turner, "then I

don't see how they can object to us assessing \$1,000 worth of shares in American Tel and Tel [AT&T] at the same rate. That's real equalization, isn't it?"⁷⁷ Such rivalries were real and significant, but they largely disappeared when it came to race, crime, and child welfare. Their appearance almost always attended discussions of issues specific to the monetary burden of one side or the other.

Regardless, the wording of the state's glue sniffing legislation mirrored that of its Mississippi neighbor. It outlawed intentional inhalation "for the purpose of causing a condition of, or inducing symptoms of intoxication, elation, euphoria, dizziness, excitement, irrational behavior, exhilaration, paralysis, stupefaction or dulling of the senses of the nervous system, or for the purpose of, in any manner, changing, distorting or disturbing the audio, visual or mental processes." It, too, exempted anesthesia. Both laws banned illegal possession, transfer, and possession with intent to transfer. There was a maximum fine of \$500 or six months in county prison. Its only real substantive difference with the Mississippi law was its list of volatile solvents, which numbered twenty.⁷⁸

The Alabama bill, however, never saw the light of day. It was the summer of 1969. The hysteria about the "glue sniffing epidemic" was beginning to pass. Besides, the Alabama House of Representatives was controlled by the iron fist of Speaker Rankin Fite. Fite was a north Alabama

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politician, a close ally of George Wallace, and a powerbroker who used his influence to pocket bills he thought to be frivolous or unnecessary. In 1967, he had created the House Committee on Highway Safety, as the *Birmingham News* explained, "as a mostly inactive depository for bills he hoped to kill."⁷⁹

The House was incensed. As the glue bill came out of committee, freshman representative Charles Wright of Etowah rose to lambast the Speaker for obstructing the business of government. "In this session," he said, "you have not led this House. You have been this House." He also claimed that one was willing to oppose such tactics due to nothing more than base fear. "We have been in session now eight days and have accomplished absolutely nothing." Fite was able to withstand such challenges, but clearly the idea that the vast majority of legislative imperatives were rank government encroachments upon individual liberty, was not a uniform opinion.⁸⁰

Although the Alabama bill met its end at the hands of a dictatorial legislative leader, the reasons for its failure must be seen as more than the sum of one man's will. By 1969, a full decade had passed since the glue sniffing epidemic had appeared in Tucson and Denver. Alabama's youth were still susceptible to chemical enticements and dangers, but gone were the national headlines warning of

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dangerous rooftop sex orgies. The disease remained but the hysteria had largely dissipated.

The following year, in 1970, Hawaii congresswoman Patsy Mink crusaded for a federal law to regulate glue sniffing. She remained adamant that even if the headlines had gotten smaller and the news stories had moved farther back in the paper, the problem had not magically been solved. The only way to give authorities the power they needed to police the problem was to provide federal legislation.⁸¹ It was the great lesson of civil rights. Federal action, not that of individual states, led to tangible, permanent solutions. Her effort failed, drowned as it would be by the larger imperatives of Vietnam and Black Power—the same sort of momentum that kept the Deep South from considering such legislation until the second half of the 1960s.

Ultimately, the glue-sniffing epidemic was a creature of hysteria. When that hysteria began to fade, so too did the "problem." Children still abused model airplane glue. The decline of interest, however, kept Alabama from passing a state law and Mink from convincing Congress to pass a federal law also ultimately moved model airplane glue out of public perception. In the decades to come, cocaine, crack, and other drugs would create their own hysteria, but they would affect a far different constituency and come attendant with their own specific circumstances. By that time,

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adolescent glue sniffing had drifted completely from the public debate.

Still, the South's eventual consideration of 1960s glue-sniffing legislation, with whatever deliberate speed it took to arrive at that point, demonstrated that the region was perfectly willing to impinge on personal liberty and Sunbelt business imperatives to aid remedying the ills of its population, functionally nullifying all the arguments it made on the barricades of the Civil Rights Movement. Through the variations in legal intent and scope, each Deep South state, save Alabama, passed legislation that regulated the purchase, transfer, and inhalation of toxic solvents to help protect the youth of the South. In the process, it developed the most comprehensive regional push to quell the epidemic, willingly bending its own legislative assumptions to ensure effective control. Such, it seemed, was the only way to protect southern children from "Dante's immortal hell."

Notes

¹Robert Coram, "Glue Sniffers Tempt Injury, Death," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 12 June 1966, 51.

² Holt quoted in Ibid.

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³Ibid.

⁴Coram, "Glue Sniffers, 51.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷"A Question Arises," *Atlanta Journal*, 22 July 1968, 18.

⁸Edward M. Brecher and the Editors of Consumer Reports Magazine, *The Consumers Union Report: Licit and Illicit Drugs*, <http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/LIBRARY/studies/cu/cumenu.htm>, Part IV, "Inhalants, solvents and glue-sniffing," Chapter 43, "The historical antecedents of glue-sniffing" [hereinafter cited as *The Consumers Union Report*, Chapter 43]; and Charles Wm. Sharp and Mary Lee Brehm, *Review of Inhalants: Euphoria to Dysfunction*, NIDA Research Monograph 15, (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, October 1977), 2 [hereinafter cited as NIDA].

⁹ *The Consumers Union Report*, Chapter 44; and NIDA, 3-4.

¹⁰ *The Consumers Union Report*, Chapter 44; "L.I. Youths Inhale Glue in Model Kits for Narcotic

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Effect," *New York Times*, 6 October 1961, 37; "City Investigating 'Kicks' from Glue," *New York Times*, 26 September 1962, 24; "City Plans Drive On Glue-Sniffing," *New York Times*, 25 April 1963, 35; "Youth Killed in Plunge," *New York Times*, 5 December 1963, 52; and "City Acts to Halt Sniffing of Glue," *New York Times*, 18 December 1963, 43. For more on Utah, see Donald E. Houseworth, "A Study of Retreatment in Glue Sniffing and Non-Glue-Sniffing Delinquents In Utah," PhD dissertation, Brigham Young University, 1968.

¹¹ "Slain Scout Aide Honored at Mass," *New York Times*, 31 January 1964, 32; "Store Owner Accused of Selling Glue to Boy Killed in Plunge," *New York Times*, 3 March 1964, 26; "Boy, 13, Sniffing Glue, Falls Into Gowanus and Drowns," *New York Times*, 26 August 1964, 16; "Curb on Glue Sales Urged," *New York Times*, 30 August 1964, 94; "Sniffing of Fluid is Fatal to Boy; 4 Others Made Ill," *New York Times*, 19 June 1965, 25; "Youth Dies After Sniffing Cleaning Fluid at Party," *New York Times*, 9 January 1965, 52; "Lacquer-Thinner Sniffing Blamed in 5 Deaths in Japan," *New York Times*, 15 June 1967, 4; and "FADS: The New Kick," *Time*, 16 February 1962, 55.

¹² The states who had passed such laws were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,

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and Rhode Island. Lenore R. Kupperstein and Ralph M. Susman, "A Bibliography on the Inhalation of Glue Fumes and Other Toxic Vapors—A Substance Abuse Practice Among Adolescents," *The International Journal of the Addictions* 3 (Spring 1968): 183.

¹³ "Glue Sniffing Could Become More Serious," *Baton Rouge Advocate*, 21 April 1966, 4-C.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "House Bill No. 752," *Legislative Calendar of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 193; and "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 288, 330, 643, 685, 907-908.

¹⁷ "Model Glue Bill Sent to Floor by House Unit," *Baton Rouge Advocate*, 3 June 1966, 10C.

¹⁸ "Monroe Student Found Dead in Abandoned Car," *Baton Rouge Advocate*, 11 June 1966, 10A; and "Gas Sniffing Blamed Here As Boy Dies," *Monroe Morning World*, 11 June 1966, 1.

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¹⁹ "Glue Sniffing Is Outlawed by N.O. Council," *Baton Rouge Advocate*, 24 June 1966, 15A; and "City Council Passes Law to Curb 'Glue Sniffing'," *Louisiana Weekly*, 2 July 1966, 2, 8.

²⁰ "City Council Passes Law to Curb 'Glue Sniffing'," *Louisiana Weekly*, 2 July 1966, 2, 8.

²¹ The bill's sponsors (with their parishes) were: Eddie L. Sapir, William A. Gill, Jr., Donald L. Fortier, Edward L. Boesch, Charles Smither, Ernest J. Hessler, Jr., Charles Bordes, III, Harry J. Hillensbeck, Joseph S. Casey, Clyde F. Bell, Jr., Edward F. LeBreton, Jr., John P. Sullivan, Eugene G. O'Brien, Arthur A. Crais, Thomas A. Early, Jr., Stephen K. Daley, Vernon J. Gregson, Salvador Anzelmo, and Anthony J. Vesich, Jr., Orleans Parish; James E. Beeson, William J. Dwyer, and Francis E. "Hank" Lauricella, Jefferson Parish; Luther F. Cole, Joe Keogh, Lillian W. Walker, and William F. "Bill" Bernhard, Jr., East Baton Rouge Parish; J. Bennett Johnston, Jr., and Taylor W. O'Hearn (Republican), Caddo Parish; Roderick L. "Rod" Miller (Republican), Lafayette Parish; Richard E. Talbot and Cleveland J. Marcel, Sr., Terrebonne Parish; Joel T. Chaisson, St. Charles Parish; Risley C. "Pappy" Triche, Assumption Parish; Allen C. Gremillion, Acadia Parish; S.M. Morgan, Jr., Red River Parish; Gordon E. "Buddy" Causey, Tangipahoa Parish; W.J. "Edge" Richardson, Caldwell Parish; T.J. Strother,

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Allen Parish; Richard P. "Dick" Guidry, Lafourche Parish; Joseph Emile Coreil, Evangeline Parish; Thomas Marx Hoffman, Iberville Parish; Samuel B. Nunez, Jr., St. Bernard Parish; J.L. Lacy, Bienville Parish; James P. Smith, Union Parish; Warren J. Simon, Vermillion Parish. David R. Poynter, *Membership in the Louisiana House of Representatives, 1812-2012* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana House of Representatives, 2010), 10, 12, 22, 33, 44, 54, 81, 93, 110, 116, 126, 135, 196, 225, 232, 235, 276, 286, 290, 293.

²² The four representatives voting against the original bill were Joe Henry Cooper from DeSoto Parish, Conway LeBleu from Cameron Parish, Larry Parker from Rapides Parish, and Harry M. Hollins from Calcasieu Parish. "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 907-908; and Poynter, *Membership in the Louisiana House of Representatives, 1812-2012*, 49, 55, 73, 222.

²³ "UVL Backs Legislation to Stop 'Glue Sniffing'," *Louisiana Weekly*, 11 June 1966, 1, 10; and Adam Fairclough, *Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 513.

²⁴ The others were Michael O'Keefe, Olaf

Fink, and Jules Mollere. Michael H. O'Keefe was also from New Orleans. He would later become president of the Senate, a post he would use as a staging ground for mail fraud and obstruction of justice. He would be convicted in 1983. Olaf J. Fink was yet another New Orleans politician, serving as senator from Orleans Parish. Jules G. Mollere was the state senator from Jefferson Parish, west New Orleans. "House Bill No. 752," *Legislative Calendar of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 193; and "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 599, 601, 1403-1404; "US Judge Orders a New Trial for Head of Louisiana Senate," *New York Times*, 27 October 1982; "Louisiana State Senate President is Found Guilty," *The Spokesman-Review*, 5 February 1983, 36; and Arthur E. McEnany, *Membership in the Louisiana Senate, 1880-2004* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Senate, 2002), 60, 86-87.

²⁵ Substances specifically banned in the legislation were toluol, hexane, trichloroethylene, acetone, toluene, ethyl acetate, methyl ethyl ketone, trichlorochthane, isopropanol, methyl isobutyl ketone, methyl cellosolve acetate, and cyclohexanone. "Act No. 110 (House Bill No. 752)," *State of Louisiana, Acts of the Legislature*, Volume 1, Regular Session, 1966, 306-307.

²⁶ "Act No. 110 (House Bill No. 752)," *State of Louisiana, Acts of the Legislature*, Volume 1, Regular Session, 1966, 306-307.

²⁷ The number was actually higher than twenty, because Senate revisions placed, for example, toluol and toluene in the same category and worded other entries differently. The proposed amendment's list included acetone, amylacetate, benzol or benzene, butyl acetate, butyl alcohol, carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, cyclohexanone, ethanol or ethyl alcohol, ethyl acetate, hexane, isopropanol or isopropyl alcohol, isopropyl acetate, methyl "cellosolve" acetate, methyl ethyl ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, toluol or toluene, trichloroethylene, triscresyl phosphate, and xylol or xylene. "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 1558.

²⁸ The twenty-four hour sales ban did provide an exception for model or hobby kits that included glue in its packaging. "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 1558.

²⁹ "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the

Legislature, 1966, 1509, 1513-1514, 1558-1559, 1593-1594.

³⁰ Cooper, LeBleu, and Hollins all voted for the revised final version of the bill. Parker was absent. "House Bill No. 752," *Legislative Calendar of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 193; and "House Bill No. 752," *Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana*, Twenty-Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature, 1966, 1884, 1886.

³¹ "Criminal Code: Part V. Offenses Affecting the Public Morals," *Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, Act 2 of the Extraordinary Session of 1950*, Vol. 2 (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1950), 369-373; and "Offenses Affecting the Health and Morals of Minors," *West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated: Revised Statutes*, Sections 14:1 to 14:End, Vol. 9 (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1951), 531-538.

³² "Criminal Code: Part V. Offenses Affecting the Public Morals," *Louisiana Revised Statutes 1972*, Pocket Parts, Vol. 2 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Law Institute, 1973), 145-151.

³³ *Louisiana v. Dimopoullas* (1972), 260 La. 874, 257 So. 2d 644; and "Criminal Code: § 93.1. Model glue; use of; unlawful sales to minors;

penalties," *West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated: Revised Statutes*, Sections 14:74 to 14:End, Vol. 9A (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1986), 120-121.

³⁴ "HB 1378," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, Volume 1, Regular Session [Including Extension] of the Forty-First Legislature [under the Constitution of 1885], April 4, 1967, through July 14, 1967, 406; and "SB 893," *Journal of the Senate, State of Florida*, Forty-First Regular Session April 4 Through July 14, 1967, 294.

³⁵ The bill's cosponsors were John R. Broxon (D), Gulf Breeze; J. Emory Cross (D), Gainesville; John E. Mathews, Jr. (D), Jacksonville; Verle A. Pope (D), St. Augustine; T. Truett Ott (D), Tampa; Ben Hill Griffin, Jr. (D), Frostproof; Jerry Thomas (D), Lake Park; Robert L. Shevin (D), Miami; George L. Hollahan, Jr. (D), Coral Gables; Ralph R. Poston (D), Miami; Richard B. Stone (D), Miami; Elizabeth Johnson (R), Cocoa Beach; Ralph R. Clayton (R), DeLand; Kenneth Plante (R), Altamonte Springs; Robert H. Helrod (R), Windermere; C.W. Bill Young (R), Pinellas Park; Harold S. Wilson (R), Bellair; Richard J. Deeb (R), St. Petersburg; Joseph A. McClain, Jr. (R), Tampa; Warren S. Henderson (R), Venice; David C. Lane (R), Ft. Lauderdale; and John W. Bell (R), Ft. Lauderdale. "SB 893," *Journal of the Senate, State of Florida*, Forty-First Regular Session April 4 Through July 14, 1967, 294; and "Members of

the Senate, Regular Session, 1967," *Journal of the Senate, State of Florida*, Forty-First Regular Session April 4 Through July 14, 1967, 24.

³⁶ Joining Firestone was Harold G. Featherstone, a Democrat from nearby Hialeah and Guy W. Spicola, a Democrat from Tampa, as well as Robert W. Rust, a Republican from Palm Beach and Thomas M. Gallen, a Democrat from Bradenton. "HB 1378," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, Volume 1, Regular Session [Including Extension] of the Forty-First Legislature [under the Constitution of 1885], April 4, 1967, through July 14, 1967, 406, 667, 785, 1030, 1679; and "Members of the House of Representatives, Regular Session 1967," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, Volume 1, Regular Session [Including Extension] of the Forty-First Legislature [under the Constitution of 1885], April 4, 1967, through July 14, 1967, 9.

³⁷ "SB 893," *Journal of the Senate, State of Florida*, Forty-First Regular Session April 4 Through July 14, 1967, 747, 1111, 1133, 1161, 1206.

³⁸ "SB 893," *Journal of the Senate, State of Florida*, Forty-First Regular Session April 4 Through July 14, 1967, 1257, 1292.

³⁹ "HB 1378," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, Volume 1, Regular Session

[Including Extension] of the Forty-First Legislature [under the Constitution of 1885], April 4, 1967, through July 14, 1967, 406, 941; and "HB 1378," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, Volume 2, Regular Session [Including Extension] of the Forty-First Legislature [under the Constitution of 1885], April 4, 1967, through July 14, 1967, 1313, 1340, 1369, 1454.

⁴⁰ *History of Legislation, 1967 Regular Session, Florida Legislature*, Legislative Information Division, Joint Legislative Management Committee, Photocopy Reduction (Jacksonville: Fla-Ga Law Publishing, Inc., 1988), 173, 255; "HB 1378," *Journal of the House of Representatives*, Volume 2, Regular Session [Including Extension] of the Forty-First Legislature [under the Constitution of 1885], April 4, 1967, through July 14, 1967, 1682, 1714-1715; and "SB 893," *Journal of the Senate, State of Florida*, Forty-First Regular Session April 4 Through July 14, 1967, 1257, 1292, 1676.

⁴¹ Florida's list of banned substances included acetone, amylacetate, benzol or benzene, butyl acetate, butyl alcohol, carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, cyclohexanone, ethanol or ethyl alcohol, ethyl acetate, hexane, isopropanol or isopropyl alcohol, isopropyl acetate, methyl "cellosolve" acetate, methyl ethyl ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, toluol or toluene, trichloroethylene, tricresyl

phosphate, and xylol or xylene. "CHAPTER 67-416; Senate Bill No. 893," *Regular Session 1967, General Acts and Resolutions Adopted by the Legislature of Florida*, Volume I, Part One, 1967, 1286-1288.

⁴² "Chapter 877: Miscellaneous Crimes," *Official Florida Statutes 1967*, State of Florida, 1967, 3843-3846; and "877.11, Inhalation, ingestion, possession, sale, purchase, or transfer of harmful chemical substances; penalties," *West's Florida Statutes Annotated*, Volume 22D, Title XLVI, Crimes (Egan, MN: West Group, 2000), 478-480.

⁴³ *Florida Juvenile Court Statistics, 1965, 1966, 1967* (Tallahassee: State Department of Public Welfare, 1968), Florida State Library, iii, v, xv, xvii, xxvii, xxix.

⁴⁴ "Drugs and Substance Abuse," *Florida Health Notes* 61 (October 1969): 272; Department of Education, *Status Report: Drug Education, 1971-72* (Tallahassee: State of Florida, January 1972), 1; *Drug Abuse in Florida* (Tallahassee: Governor's Task Force on Narcotics, May 1970), 1-10; and *1974 Summary of Florida State Plan for Drug Abuse Prevention* (Tallahassee: Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 1974), Florida State Library, 4-19.

⁴⁵ *In the Interest of P.G. and G.G., Minors*,

No. 73-47, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, 3 July 1973; and *H.R.H., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee*, No. 74-420, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, 29 October 1974.

⁴⁶ *Linville v. Florida*, No. 51583, Supreme Court of Florida, 18 May 1978; and Earl Faircloth, "Crimes: Inhalation or Possession of Model Glue," *Biennial Report of the Attorney General, State of Florida* (Tallahassee, 1969), 242.

⁴⁷ State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1961* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1961); State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1962* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1962); State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1963* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1963); State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1964* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1964); State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1965* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1965); State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1966* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1966); and State

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Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1967* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1967), 16, 17.

⁴⁸ State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1967* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1967), 4, 16, 17; and State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1968* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1968), 17.

⁴⁹ "HB No. 281," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 126, 328-329; and "SB No. 1702," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 130-131, 267, 273-274, 289.

⁵⁰ "HB No. 281," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 345, 352-353, 364, 1056, 1068-1069, 1080; "SB No. 1702," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 345; and "HB No. 281," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 334, 938-939, 1092-1093.

⁵¹ William E. McKinley and Jean D. Muirhead (listed as Mrs. Marvin L. Muirhead) both represented

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Mississippi's 27th senatorial district, Hinds County. "Part XIII: Biographical Data of Senators, 1968-1972," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 1777; and "SB No. 1702," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 131.

⁵² William Valentine Jones, from Waynesboro, was both an attorney and cattle farmer. Corbet Lee Patridge was from Schalter, in Leflore County, a cotton farmer who had served as Public Relations Representative for the National Cotton Council. Theodore Smith, from Corinth, was another farmer who represented both Alcorn and Tippah counties. Thomas Arnie Watson, from North Carrollton, represented Attala, Carroll, and Montgomery counties. He was a cattle and tree farmer. The fifth no vote was Biloxi's John Thomas Munro, and Biloxi, though rural by some standards, was the seat of Harrison County, the state's second most populous county. Louisiana had two Republicans co-sponsoring legislation, but that was largely a creature of large urban areas carrying the capacity for a handful of Republican legislators. Mississippi had no such Republicans. Its entire roster of legislators were Democrats. "Part XIII: Biographical Data of Senators, 1968-1972," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 1774-1786; and "SB No. 1702," *Journal of the Senate*

of the State of Mississippi (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 273.

⁵³ Russell Davis, Sutton Marks, Ralph Sowell, Joseph Moss, Charles Mitchell, and Emmett Owens all represented Jackson's Hinds County. James B. True, Tommy Gollott, Clyde Woodfield, and James C. Simpson were from Harrison County, home to Biloxi and Gulfport in the far southern portion of the state. Ralph Herrin was from Collins, Frank Carlton from Greenville, Marvin B. Henley from Philadelphia, and Helen McDade from DeKalb. "House of Representatives by Districts and Counties," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 1525-1543; and "HB No. 281," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 126.

⁵⁴ "House of Representatives by Districts and Counties," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 1525-1543; and "HB No. 281," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 353.

⁵⁵ The senators voting no on the final version of Mississippi's bill were Munroe, William B. Alexander, a lawyer from Cleveland, William Ervin Corr, a lawyer from Sardis, Joseph McRae Mosby, a

farmer and meat packer from urban Meridian, John William Powell, a cattle and timber farmer from Liberty, R.B. "Breezy" Reeves, an attorney from McComb, Kenneth Barkley Robertson, an attorney from Pascagoula, Ben Harry Stone, an attorney from Gulfport in populous Harrison County, and H.C. Strider, a farmer from Charleston. "Part XIII: Biographical Data of Senators, 1968-1972," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 1774-1786; and "HB No. 281," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Mississippi* (Jackson: Hederman Brothers, 1968), 1093.

⁵⁶ "Chapter 347: House Bill No. 281," *Laws of the State of Mississippi*, 1968, 483; and "Act No. 110 (House Bill No. 752)," State of Louisiana, *Acts of the Legislature*, Vol 1, Regular Session, 1966, 306-307.

⁵⁷ "Crimes and Misdemeanors, Chapter 1, Title 11," *Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated, Recompiled*, Vol. Two A—1956, Crimes; Special Actions (Atlanta: Harrison Company, 1957), 216-219; "Chapter 27: Crimes Affecting Public Health: 97-27-33. Poisons; inhalation of toxic vapors from model glue; unlawful glue sales to minors," *Mississippi Codes*, 1942, *Laws*, 1968; and "Crimes and Misdemeanors, Chapter 1, Title 11," *1972 Cumulative Supplement to Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated, Recompiled*, Vol 2A (Atlanta: Harrison Company, 1972), 120.

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⁵⁸ Of the fifteen delinquent teenagers, the race numbers proved more balanced, and the gender numbers seemed to be moving in that direction. Eight of the defendants were black, seven white. Twelve were male, three female. State Department of Public Welfare, *Mississippi Youth Court Statistics, 1961* (Jackson: Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 1969), 17.

⁵⁹ "Glue Sniff Bill Passed in DeKalb," *Atlanta Journal*, 24 August 1966, 82.

⁶⁰ Junie Hamilton, "City Limits Sale of Glue for Models," *Atlanta Journal*, 7 February 1967, 5.

⁶¹ Later that year, the same newsletter reported on the related consequences of sniffing the contents of aerosol cans. "Glue Sniffing...The Quest for Ecstasy," *Georgia's Health* 47 (February 1967): 1; and "'Sniffing' Contents of Aerosol Cans Leads to Death," *Georgia's Health* 47 (October 1967): 3.

⁶² "Glue Sniffing...The Quest for Ecstasy," *Georgia's Health* 47 (February 1967): 2.

⁶³ John Askins, "Glue Sniffer Learns Lesson," *Atlanta Journal*, 21 September 1967, 22A.

⁶⁴ "SB 205," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the Regular Session* (Monday, January

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8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 15-16, 36.

⁶⁵ Orville Gaines, "Boy in Gun Battle Cites Glue Sniffing," *Atlanta Journal*, 16 January 1968, 8B.

⁶⁶ "SB 205," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the Regular Session* (Monday, January 8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 151, 191-192; "Senate OK's Bill to Outlaw Glue-Sniffing," *Atlanta Journal*, 19 January 1968, 2A; "SB 205," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia at Regular Session* (Monday, January 8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 2975-2976; and "Intentional Inhaling of Fumes of Model Glue, Etc., No. 1122 (Senate Bill No. 205)," *Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia*, 1968, 1194-1196.

⁶⁷ "SB 205," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the Regular Session* (Monday, January 8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 191-192; and "Senate OK's Bill to Outlaw Glue-Sniffing," *Atlanta Journal*, 19 January 1968, 2A.

⁶⁸ "SB 205," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia at Regular Session* (Monday, January 8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 499, 511, 603, 1165, 2975-2976.

⁶⁹ Charles Edward Graves was the other no

vote in the House. He, too, was from Rome's Floyd County and sat next to Starnes in the chamber. The black legislators who approved the measure were there because of the ruling in *Bond v. Floyd* (1966), instigated by civil rights leader Julian Bond, which decided the case on First Amendment protections of free speech. "SB 205," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia at Regular Session* (Monday, January 8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 2975-2978, 3404-3405; "SB 205," *Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the Regular Session* (Monday, January 8, 1968 – Friday, March 8, 1968), 1800, 1863-1864, 2389-2392; "Lowery, Starnes Qualify to Run for New Terms," *Rome News-Tribune*, 24 May 1966, 1; "Silent Partners: The Role of the Church in Liberalizing Georgia's Abortion Laws," *Georgia Right to Life*, <http://www.grtl.org/history.asp>; "Intentional Inhaling of Fumes of Model Glue, Etc., No. 1122 (Senate Bill No. 205)," *Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia*, 1968, 1194-1196; Ben W. Fortson, *Georgia's Official Register*, 1967-1968, Department of Archives and History, 1967, 409-410; and *Bond v. Floyd* (1966), 385 US 116.

⁷⁰ At the time, Bolton cited Article I, Section IV, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution: "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been

made by an existing general law." That paragraph has since been moved to Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV (a), and the legislature has since amended the restriction to include an exception that it may "by general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws." It has, in other words, superceded the ruling of both the Supreme Court's drinking and driving rulings and the Attorney General's glue sniffing opinion to make such allowances acceptable. Arthur K. Bolton, "Unofficial Opinion U70-59 (4/7/70)," *Opinions of the Attorney General*, 1970 (Atlanta: The Harrison Company, 1970), 299; *Giles v. Gibson* (1952), *Reports of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia*, April and September Terms 1951, and January Term, 1952, Vol 208 (Atlanta: Harrison Company, 1952), 850-853; *Jenkins, Chief of Police, etc. v. Jones* (1953), *Reports of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia*, April and September Terms, 1952 and January and April Terms, 1953, Vol 209 (Atlanta: Harrison Company, 1953), 758-768; and *Constitution of the State of Georgia* (Atlanta: Secretary of State, 2009).

⁷¹ Substances banned by the final version of the Georgia act were: acetone, amyl chloride (iso- and tertiary), benzene, carbon disulfide, carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, ether, ethyl acetate, ethyl alcohol, ethylene dichloride, isopropyl acetate,

isopropyl alcohol, isopropyl ether, methyl acetate, methyl alcohol, propylene dichloride, propylene oxide, trichloroethylene, amyl acetate, amyl alcohol, butyl acetate, butyl alcohol, butyl ether, diethylcarbonate, diethylene oxide (Dioxan), dipropyl ketone, ethyl butyrate, ethylene glycol monoethyl ether (Cellosolve), ethylene glycol monomethyl ether acetate (Methyl Cellosolve Acetate), isobutyl alcohol, methyl amyl acetate, methyl amyl alcohol, methyl isobutyl ketone, and toluene. "Intentional Inhaling of Fumes of Model Glue, Etc., No. 1122 (Senate Bill No. 205)," *Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia*, 1968, 1194-1196; and "Controlled Substances: Article 4: Sale, Possession, Transfer, or Inhalation of Model Glue," T.16, C.13, A.4, *Official Code of Georgia Annotated*, Vol. 14A, 2007 Edition, Title 16, Crimes and Offenses, Chapters 10-17.

⁷²"Controlled Substances: Article 4: Sale, Possession, Transfer, or Inhalation of Model Glue," T.16, C.13, A.4, *Official Code of Georgia Annotated*, Vol. 14A, 2007 Edition, Title 16, Crimes and Offenses, Chapters 10-17.

⁷³*Birmingham News*, 6 May 1969, 14.

⁷⁴"H 200," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Alabama*, Regular Session of 1969, vol. I, 57.

⁷⁵"H 200," *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Alabama*, Regular Session of 1969, vol. I, 370, 431-432, 976-977; *Birmingham News*, 11 June 1969, 12; and "Report of Standing Committee, HB 200," Alabama Secretary of State, Committee Files of the Legislature, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL.

⁷⁶W.E. (Bill) Owens, Jr., was from Gadsden, Fred Ray Lybrand from Anniston, and Joe C. McCorquodale, Jr., from Jackson. "Roster of the House of Representatives of Alabama," *Alabama Laws (and Joint Resolutions) of the Legislature of Alabama*, vol. III, 1969, 2390-2395.

⁷⁷*Montgomery Advertiser*, 11 June 1969, 11.

⁷⁸The proposed Alabama statute banned acetone, amylacetate, benzol or benzene, butyl acetate, butyl alcohol, carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, cyclohexanone, ethanol or ethyl alcohol, ethyl acetate, hexane, isopropanol or isopropyl alcohol, isopropyl acetate, methyl "cellosolve" acetate, methyl ethyl ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, toluol or toluene, trichloroethylene, tricresyl phosphate, xylol or xylene. It also included a ban for "any other solvent, material, substance, chemical or combination thereof, having the property of releasing toxic vapors." "A Bill To Be

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Entitled "An Act," #2-288:5/23/68, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL.

⁷⁹ Stephen G. Katsinas, "George C. Wallace and the Founding of Alabama's Public Two-Year Colleges," *Journal of Higher Education* 65 (July-August 1994): 451, 454; and *Birmingham News*, 7 May 1969, 2.

⁸⁰ *Birmingham News*, 11 June 1969, 59, 13 June 1969, 1, 2, 4, 17.

⁸¹ "Testimony by Representative Patsy T. Mink before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Legislation to Protect Children from Glue-Sniffing," 17 February 1970, Patsy Mink Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Special Collections, Smith College, Northampton, MA.

Schooling for Missionaries: The Changing Methods of Young J. Allen in China

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When Christian missionary John Geddie died in 1872, a memorial was placed in the church where he had preached during his years in the Pacific islands: "When he landed here, in 1848, there were no Christians, and when he left here, in 1872, there were no heathens."¹ Such was the esteemed Christian goal in the nineteenth century, set by mission board leaders and carried out through the religious tenacity of their missionaries in the field. These emissaries saw the nations beyond their borders as wastelands of unholy customs and idolatry. Any man or woman sent forth from the United States to spread the gospel might have been imagining just the kind of utter transformation proclaimed in the case of John Geddie.

This is the sort of challenge Methodist minister Young John Allen faced when he boarded